A BRIEF

STATE

OF THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

CHURCH AUTHORITY.

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IN order to form a definite and unprejudiced Idea of the Authority of a Chriſtian Church, let us conſider the matter abſtractedly from all preſent Chriſtian Eſtabliſhments; and ſuppoſe a Nation of Pagans to have received, by ſome means or other, the Bible tranſlated into their own language: let it be ſuppoſed alſo, that they believed all the facts related in it, to be true; and, of conſequence, held themſelves obliged to conform their conduct to the rules therein preſcribed.

There is a great natural inequality in the corporal ſtrength of different individuals, and in the combined ſtrength of different numbers of individuals: this has, in all ages and countries, been the moſt common and the moſt

unjuſt ſource of perſonal and national dominion. There is a ſimilar inequality in the intellectual powers of different men, and of different Aſſemblies of men: and it is perhaps more difficult to forbear affecting a Tyranny over the Opinions, than over the Perſons, of Mankind.

Let it be taken for granted, however, that every individual in this nation of Pagans, readily allowed to every other the ſame liberty which he claimed for himſelf; the liberty of underſtanding his Bible according to the meaſure of his own capacity, and of promulgating without reſtraint, without loſs of reputation or fortune, what he thought he underſtood.

The equity of this principle cannot be controverted, without ſubverting the moſt indefeaſible rights of mankind: and this being admitted, the ſocial propenſities of human nature would ſoon lead individuals to form, and the commands of their Bible would enjoin them to frequent, public Aſſemblies for the

the worſhip of God. Hence there would ſpring up in this nation many diſtinct religious Societies, differing ſomewhat from each other with reſpect to particular tenets, but agreeing in the general belief of the Bible; they would have ſome diſtinguiſhing marks, and yet a ſtrong reſemblance throughout—*Facies non omnibus una, Nec diverſa tamen.*

Socinians would unite in public worſhip with Socinians; Sabellians with Sabellians; Arians with Arians; and every ſect would be eſteemed unorthodox by the reſt. A firm conviction, however, of the general imbecillity of human reaſon, a reverence for the Example of Jeſus Chriſt, and a reſpect for that new commandment of loving one another, which they would have learnt from their Bible, would prevent them from murdering one another, for, what none of them could help, a diverſity of opinion ariſing from a diverſity of Intellect.

Each of theſe diſtinct Societies would, as to the purpoſe of their union, be abſolutely free and independent, ſubject to no manner of

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inſpection, direction, or controul, from any other, or from all the others united together. For, if the wiſeſt individual in the whole nation, could have no right to compel the moſt unwiſe to be of his opinion in any point; *à fortiori*, an Aſſembly compoſed of individuals inferior in wiſdom to the wiſeſt, could have no right over an Aſſembly compoſed of individuals ſuperior in wiſdom to the moſt unwiſe: becauſe theſe Aſſemblies, conſidered as diſtinct intellectual perſons, approach nearer to an equality of wiſdom, than the extreme individuals, whom we yet ſuppoſed to be independent of each other in every point of private opinion.

Giving the name of Churches to theſe ſeveral Aſſemblies, we may define a Chriſtian Church, to be, a Voluntary aſſembly of men acknowledging the truth of the Bible and meeting together for the public worſhip of God. A Church is a voluntary Aſſembly; and, as ſuch, ſubject to no external ſuperintendance or juriſdiction: but as no buſineſs can be commodiouſly tranſacted in any Aſ-

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ſembly without the eſtabliſhment of certain rules, appointing the time and place of convention, and regulating the proceedings of the Members when met, every Church muſt be ſubject to an internal juriſdiction, muſt have an internal power of framing ſuch ordinances as may be thought moſt conducive towards the attaining the end of their meeting.

It is probable that the different Churches, into which we have ſuppoſed this newly converted nation to be divided, would differ as much from each other in their ordinances for the celebration of public worſhip, and in their modes of Church Government, as in their opinions concerning points of Doctrine. Some, knowing that God was to be worſhiped in Spirit and in Truth, would think all ceremonies improper; as ſpringing, in their opinion, from ſuperſtition and producing a ſpecies of Idolatry. Others, bearing in mind the infirmity of human nature, would eſteem ceremonies uſeful in preſerving order, and in elevating the intellectual conceptions to a ſpiritual devotion, by the impreſſions made on the

the organs of ſenſe; and they would think themſelves fully authorized in the moderate uſe of them, from the Inſtitution of the Jewiſh Church.

Some, jealous of their ſpiritual liberties, and apprehenſive of the encroachments which bad men might be diſpoſed to make upon them, would be for lodging the power of the whole Aſſembly in the Suffrages of the Majority of the Members. Others, conſidering that moſt public Aſſemblies were guided by the fineſſe and management of a few men ſuperior in ſagacity or diſhoneſty to the reſt, and that queſtions of much importance were often decided in a tumultuary way, without being duly weighed, would be deſirous of entruſting the concerns of their Church to a few Men of approved probity and acknowledged wiſdom, ſelected by themſelves from their own Body: of theſe again there would probably be made a diſtinction; by ſome they would be inveſted with an equal, by others with an unequal authority.

It might be expected too, that different Churches would with too much warmth endeavour to support their different modes of Government and Worship, by attempting to prove them correspondent to such as were established by the Apostles; taking it for granted, that the nearer they approached to the model of an Apostolic Church, the more perfect they would become: not considering, in the first place, that the Apostles might, for the sake of gaining the Jews to Christianity, have a respect in a great many particulars to the forms of the Jewish Synagogue, which are in no wise binding upon Christians of later Ages; nor, in the second, that the Apostles were endued with such extraordinary Gifts of the Spirit, as might make their example, in many instances of spiritual discipline especially, very unfit for future Christians to follow.

None of these several Churches could have any power of compelling any individual, either to become a Member of their Society, or to continue one; for the End of the Constitution

tution of a religious Society is fruſtrated by Force, the worſhip of God is vitiated by Compulſion, and when it ceaſes to be voluntary, becomes not indifferent, but impious.

But ought not Private Opinions to be overruled by Public Wiſdom? ought not the religious conduct of individuals to be regulated in each Church by the Preſcript of the whole Body? No, by no means. In civil Inſtitutions indeed, Diſſentients from the general voice ordinarily acquieſce under it, and individuals are juſtly concluded by the determination of the Majority: but in religious Societies, the Caſe is *toto cælo* different; and this difference is derived from the different Ends Men have in view in forming civil, and religious Aſſociations. A Man's Perſon may be protected, and his Property ſecured by the aſſociated Force of many; but his moral Diſpoſition cannot be meliorated, his Soul cannot be ſaved, by the aſſociated Wiſdom of his Church, by any other Man but himſelf. This difference will appear clearer, by exa-

mining the Origin and Extent of Civil as oppoſed to Eccleſiaſtical Power.

Civil Power, ariſes from general Compact, and can be neither different in kind from, nor ſuperior in degree to, that which the individuals compoſing a community entruſted to the Magiſtrate, upon their entrance into Society. It is to little purpoſe to object, that a Social Compact is a mere creature of the imagination, which never exiſted: ſo are the objects of many parts of Geometry and Natural Philoſophy; yet no one thinks of denying the truths demonſtrated by Euclid or Newton, though the Lines of the one, or the Elaſtic Mediums of the other, ſhould have nothing in nature perfectly correſponding to the Ideas annexed to theſe terms. Civil power, in kind, reſpects the defence of perſon and property; in degree, it is variable within certain limits, which may be aſcertained. For, on the one hand, the will of the conſtituent members cannot reſtrain civil power indefinitely; they annihilate its very exiſtence, if they do not allow it to circumſcribe in ſome degree the natural li-

berty of individuals; the extent indeed of this circumſcription muſt be defined by their own appointment. On the other hand, the will of the conſtituent members of a civil community cannot extend the Civil Power beyond a certain boundary, beyond what would reſult from the transfer of all the alienable rights of individuals. Theſe private rights are transferred to the Magiſtrate, to be uſed by him for the public good; and each individual is induced to make the transfer, from the expectation that his own private emolument will be eventually promoted, by the general application of private rights to public utility.

The power then of the civil Magiſtrate is abſolutely dependent on the will of the Community, and abſolutely independent of the will of every individual in it: yet though it be independent of individuals, it is not arbitrary in its operation, nor unlimited in its extent, even over them. It's action, in particular caſes, is circumſcribed by the proſpect of general expediency; and its extent, in all caſes, is terminated by the unalienable rights of individuals.

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Let it once ſtep beyond this Fence, and it becomes not Civil Power, but Tyrannic oppreſſion, not delegated authority, but uſurped dominion. If the Magiſtrate demands from an individual the whole of his property, for the public ſervice, he aſks what the individual has a right to give. If he requires him to expoſe his life in a juſt war, for the preſervation of the lives of the Community, he makes a requiſition which the individual has a right to grant, and which (upon the ſuppoſition that he conceded to the Magiſtrate an authority of applying, according to his diſcretion, all his private alienable rights, for the public good) he is under a perfect obligation to grant, however repugnant it may be to his inclination, or detrimental to his happineſs. Thus far the power of the Magiſtrate may reach, and it can reach no further; he cannot juſtly command an individual to infringe any one law of nature or revelation, to uſe his perſonal ſtrength or the faculties of his mind in any one way which he had no right to uſe them in before he entered into Society; becauſe that would be to uſe a power over the individual,

which the individual neither did nor could transfer to him.

Eccleſiaſtical power, ariſes alſo from general compact; but it is far leſs extenſive than civil power. The will of the Majority, or, which amounts to the ſame thing, the will of the Magiſtrate, which in all legal Governments coincides with that of the Majority, is and ought to be deciſive in every matter of civil diſſention. But the will of the Majority of the conſtituent members of a Church, cannot bind any one individual in any one point: becauſe the ſubject-matter of their authority, is not the duty of all men towards all, but of each man towards his God; the Eſſence of which conſiſts in what the will of the Majority can neither make nor deſtroy, in what their wiſdom can neither know nor controul in any wiſe in the conſcience of each individual. In oppoſition to the will of the Majority, every individual may plead his conſcience, in excuſe for his non-conformity in points of the utmoſt ſeeming indifference; and if he does ſo, there is no compulſive remedy. No aſſembly upon earth, however diſtinguiſhed by

by numbers, weight, or wiſdom, can juſtly claim a right of compelling the meaneſt individual to act contrary to his conſcience, be that conſcience ever ſo unreaſonably ſcrupulous or apparently erroneous: for that would be claiming a right of compelling a man to be guilty of a certain Sin; and no ſociety can compel a man to be guilty of a certain Sin, though the matter of the action conſtituting the Sin ſhould happen to be (as in the caſe of an erroneous conſcience it may be) highly advantageous to the public good. A Society cannot have this right: becauſe an Individual cannot transfer this right, and the power of every ſociety, whether civil or religious, is neither greater nor leſs than what the ſeparate individual gave up to the community.

Has a Church then no right to defend itſelf againſt ill-judging or deſigning men? can it neither reſtrain the turbulent, nor ſilence the blaſphemous? has it, ſtrictly ſpeaking, no power over any of its members? Yes, it has an abſolute power, not of compulſion, but of excluſion, and it leaves to the Civil Magiſtrate the

Puniſhment of Turbulence. The will of the Majority, cannot juſtly compel an individual to the uſe of any one rule or ceremony, which he thinks to be Superſtitious or Idolatrous, or any way diſpleaſing to his God; but the will of the Majority, may juſtly exclude a diſſenting individual from their Chriſtian aſſociation. You ſhall not, they may ſay to him, be in any thing a partaker with us, unleſs you will be a partaker with us in all things. You ſet up your ſingular opinion, in oppoſition to our general judgment, and refuſe to act in conformity to our determination, becauſe you think it wrong. We queſtion not your right of diſſenting from us, whatever opinion we may have of your prudence in uſing that right; we queſtion not your integrity, but we think you deceived. And remember on your part, we entreat you, that we are as free as yourſelf; we claim no power over you but from your own conſent, nor can we ſuffer you to claim any over us but from ours; you refuſe to obey numbers, can you expect that numbers ſhould obey you? No, we reject you as a member of our community, becauſe you do not ſubmit in every thing to the rules

rules which we think proper to eſtabliſh. God muſt be the judge in this matter betwixt us and you. We are as to this point independent of you and of every human Authority; and your independence we acknowledge is not a whit inferior to ours: but both of us are dependent upon God, both of us anſwerable for the rectitude or obliquity of our judgments to him. If we refuſe you Chriſtian communion without juſt cauſe, the Sin, be it greater or leſs, is ours: if without juſt cauſe you make a Schiſm in the Church of Chriſt, the Sin, be it greater or leſs, lies at your door. It behoves us both to be circumſpect in our deciſions; and ſince it is a matter of great moment, it behoves each of us candidly to ſuppoſe that the other hath uſed his utmoſt attention in forming his opinion: for this will diſpoſe us to a mutual diſtruſt of our own, and a mutual tolerance of the other's judgment; a temper highly neceſſary in every religious diſpute, leſt we chance to aggravate the criminality of a vincible error by the accumulated guilt of an unchriſtian malignity.

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This power of Expulſion every Church has over every one of its members; and I do not ſee how, as a Church, it can claim more. Nay, if you arm it with ſecular Authority, and give it moreover a faculty (which ſince the times of the Apoſtles no Church ever had) of looking into the very hearts of men; of clearly diſtinguiſhing between Schiſm proceeding from a wilful oppoſition to truth, and Schiſm proceeding from a conſcientious regard to Duty; I do not apprehend that you will give it a power much different from that of Expulſion, unleſs you could at the ſame time give it a faculty of foreſeeing that its cenſure, like the Chaſtiſement of an Apoſtolic Rod, would tend to Edification and not to deſtruction; to the Salvation of the Souls of thoſe upon whom it was inflicted, rather than to the rendering them obdurate and irreclaimable.

In the formation of Chriſtian Churches amongſt a nation of Pagans, it is probable that the diviſion of believers into Clergy and Laity, into regular teachers and hearers, would not

be immediately made. Every one would preſume it was his duty to preach the word to his Brethren, according to the beſt of his apprehenſion; and he would think himſelf authorized in this preſumption, not only from the practice of the Jewiſh Synagogue and the firſt Chriſtian Churches, but from the permiſſion of St. Paul himſelf; who, in forbidding women to ſpeak in the Church, may be thought to give liberty to every other perſon. This general liberty, however, would ſoon be reſtrained by general utility; a regard for decency and order and mutual Edification, would neceſſarily introduce the eſtabliſhment of an order of men, under ſome denomination or other, to whom the offices of preaching, praying, adminiſtring the ſacraments, viſiting the ſick, comforting the feeble-minded, admoniſhing the flagitious, and, in ſhort, feeding the flock of Chriſt, would by common conſent be eſpecially intruſted.

And here a great queſtion ariſes, which has not been very ſatisfactorily decided. Whether Men thus conſtituted to the public Miniſtry,

ſhould be obliged to perform the various parts of miniſterial duty, according to a mode preſcribed to them by the general voice of the Church in which they miniſtered, or in conformity to their own particular judgments? Was their office of a civil nature, this queſtion could ſcarcely have been put; every one would have allowed, that their mode of acting might have been regulated by thoſe from whom they derived their Authority of acting at all. But in the caſe in point, it has been thought that Miniſters were independent of thoſe by whom they were appointed to miniſter.

If God had in the preſent times vouchſafed to all thoſe who ſhould be appointed to miniſter in the Church of Chriſt, ſuch an eſpecial Grace as appertained to the Apoſtles and firſt miniſters of the Goſpel, then indeed an Authority might be claimed for every Miniſter, independent of the will of his particular Church; all would willingly ſubmit their private opinion to the judgment of him, who, being guided by the Spirit of truth, could not err. Upon any

any other ſuppoſition, it ſeems as if the matter ſhould be conſidered in the following manner.

In the deciſion of this queſtion, a diſtinction may be made between indifferent rites and evangelical doctrines. With reſpect to rites, which are neither commanded nor forbidden in the Bible, and which may be therefore eſteemed indifferent, every Miniſter owes a perfect Submiſſion to his Church, in the performance of them; but as to the doctrines, he owes a ſubmiſſion, not to his Church, but to his Bible. This diſtinction, however, does not remove the doubt; the queſtion recurs, Who ſhall be the judge, whether a particular doctrine be contained in the Bible, or not? Shall every Miniſter judge for himſelf, or ſhall the Church judge for all? The Church cannot judge for all, unleſs it arrogate to itſelf a ſpecies of Infallibility; nor can you allow each public Teacher to judge for himſelf, unleſs you grant that infallibility to him which you denied to his Church, to the wiſdom of an individual which you denied to the united wiſdom of many individuals.

Every Miniſter of the Goſpel of Chriſt, has an undoubted right to promulgate, is under an indiſpenſable obligation to promulgate, in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, what he in his own private judgment apprehends to be the truth. No Aſſembly of Men can lay upon him an Obligation to preach any thing as a doctrine of Chriſtianity, which he does not believe to be revealed in the holy ſcriptures; nor to conceal any thing, which he apprehends ought to be made known. In all points of doctrine, he is abſolutely independent of the will of his particular Church, and of all Churches in general. Articles may be propoſed to him as explanatory of ſcripture doctrines; he will do well to avail himſelf of the inſtruction contained in them. His ſubſcription may be required to the belief of them, or he may be prohibited from preaching againſt them; but theſe and other ſimilar reſtraints, though very properly calculated to exclude from an entrance into the Miniſtry Men who profeſs not the doctrines of the Church in which they are appointed to miniſter, cannot bind him as to his future conduct in any wiſe;

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he cannot promiſe the performance of an impoſſibility; and his belief depends not upon his will but his knowledge, and muſt be variable therewith; he cannot promiſe the performance of an act which his conſcience diſavows, and it would be a violation of the moſt ſacred obligation of conſcience to preach what he does not believe to be true, or to conceal what he does; to teach for Goſpel the commandments of men, or to with-hold from ſpeaking the things which he believes to be delivered in the Goſpel; with Peter and John he may put the queſtion, "whether it be right in the ſight of "God, to hearken unto you more than unto "God, judge ye."

The concluſion from the premiſſes ſeems to be, that in public teaching, every miniſter, after uſing the beſt means for the information of his underſtanding, is under a conſcientious obligation, in all caſes, to follow his own private judgment, how repugnant ſoever it may chance to be to the avowed tenets of the Church in which he is appointed to miniſter.

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On the other ſide of the queſtion, it appears to be wholly contradictory to common ſenſe, that an individual appointed to the Office of a public teacher, by the general conſent of an Aſſembly of Chriſtians, ſhould have a right of teaching doctrines in that Aſſembly, which the majority of that Aſſembly hold to be erroneous; that the opinion of one, ſhould be preferred to that of many. It is granted, truth cannot be inveſtigated by voting, nor is it always with the majority; but it is as likely to be with the majority as with the minority, with Numbers as with one.

Let us ſuppoſe a Church to conſiſt of an hundred perſons; and that one of the number is elected by the reſt to the Sacerdotal Office; and that this man, honeſtly uſing the unalienable right of private judgment, denies or maintains in his public teaching, doctrines which the reſt believe or do not believe to be true. Can it be ſuppoſed that the Ninety-nine are under an obligation to hear what they think damnable Hereſies? Is not every individual amongſt them under as perfect an Obligation,

Obligation, after the firſt and ſecond admonition, to avoid this Man as a Heretic, as the Miniſter himſelf is to preach what he in his private Judgment thinks to be conformable to the truth in Chriſt? Can a Church of Trinitarians conſcientiouſly liſten to a Miniſter denying the pre-exiſtence of Chriſt and the perſonality of the Holy Ghoſt? Or can a Socinian Church, ſupport the preaching of a Sabellian Miniſter? Can it be fairly required of any ſect of Chriſtians, to tolerate teachers who (without producing any ſupernatural credentials of their ſuperior knowledge) repreſent their principles as erroneous and their conſequent practice as impious? But the Miniſter is an honeſt and conſcientious Man, ſincerely wiſhes to preach the pure and unadulterated word of God, and acts in every thing according to the impulſes of an upright heart and the dictates of an unbiaſſed (as appears to him) Judgment.—Be it ſo—yet why will you deny that honeſty and integrity of conſcience to the hearers, which you ſo liberally and we hope fairly grant to their teacher? why will you compel them to hear what they perhaps

perhaps think Blaſphemy, whilſt you allow him to abſtain from the promulgation of what he perhaps thinks Blaſphemy? why may not the ninety-nine take from the hundredth that power of preaching the word of God, which for the general good they voluntarily gave to him, when they think it no longer likely to promote the end for which it was given?—But no Number of Chriſtians can take from any individual, much leſs from a Miniſter, the right of preaching the word of God.—True. Nor can any individual, much leſs can a Miniſter, take from a Number of Chriſtians, the right of rejecting what they think repugnant to the word of God. They take not ſtom him, as a Chriſtian, the right of propagating the kingdom, by preaching the Goſpel, of Chriſt; but they take from him, as a Miniſter, the right of preaching it to them, of preaching what he takes to be Goſpel, but what they think is nothing leſs.

From the matter thus conſidered, there ſeems to be, on the part of the Miniſter, a perfect right to follow in his public teaching his

his own interpretation of Scripture; and on the part of the Church, a perfect right to reject a Minister who does not in his public teaching follow their interpretation of Scripture. These interpretations may be different; and when they are so, two perfect and contradictory rights will arise: A conclusion this which appears to involve an Absurdity.

In Matters of civil dispute, equal and opposite rights cannot be supposed to exist for any length of time; because the Magistrate makes himself a final judge of right and wrong. But in religious controversy, they must necessarily arise; unless you suppose the intellects of Mankind to be precisely equal in strength, and a consequent coincidence of opinion to take place; or unless you constitute some infallible judge to decide between the maintainers of discordant doctrines. From the premisses this conclusion may probably be thought a reasonable deduction;—That every Church, as a Voluntary Assembly, hath a right to reject a Minister, voluntarily appointed by

themſelves, who preaches doctrines oppoſite to their Belief.

If it ſhould be urged, that there is an injuſtice in taking from a Miniſter his livelihood, for being an honeſt Man and preaching conſcientiouſly the truth; it may be anſwered, that he is not deprived of his ſubſiſtence for being an honeſt man or for preaching conſcientiouſly the truth, but for being (in the judgment of the people who pay him) a miſinformed man, and preaching not truth, but error. There may be ſome hardſhip in the caſe; but you cannot call it injuſtice, unleſs you take upon you to decide the point in debate, and pronounce the Church to be in an Error. If the Chuch took from him, on Account of his diverſity of Opinion, whatever he poſſeſſed excluſive of his miniſterial connexion with it, that indeed would be an Act of injuſtice; but in excluding him from the Miniſtry, you ſtill leave him his property as a citizen; nay you leave him his right as a Chriſtian of ſhaking off the duſt of his feet againſt you, of turning to ſome other

other Assembly of Christians, of labouring in the Vineyard of Christ, who will assuredly give him his due reward and an ample recompence for whatever he may have suffered for his Service, if he has hearkened to the suggestions of a well-informed Conscience.

The Civil Magistrate has an undoubted Right to give vigour to the Operation of Natural Law, by the positive Appointment of penal Sanctions, to punish with unrelenting rigour every violation of the Duties of perfect Obligation. And as the punishment of Crimes is less useful to the State than their prevention, he seems to have a right to introduce amongst the members of his Community, such precepts of Morality or Religion, as are most likely to restrain the intemperance of selfish Passion, and to create in the hearts of his Citizens a disposition to perform such Duties of imperfect Obligation, as unavoidably escape the Censure of civil Laws. But whatever Right may be allowed to the Civil Magistrate, of introducing amongst his Subjects what he may judge to be the most perfect

Syſtem of Morality or Religion, no Right can be allowed him of ſupporting his own Religion by the ſuppreſſion of others. For, from the admiſſion of this Principle, a Jewiſh or a Roman Catholic Magiſtrate would be under an Obligation to defend his Church againſt Chriſtianity or Proteſtantiſm; a Mahometan Magiſtrate would have a Right to cruſh every Chriſtian who ſhould refuſe to acknowledge the Miſſion of his Prophet; and even a Pagan Magiſtrate would have a Right to extirpate every Theiſt, who from a zeal for the Lord Jehovah ſhould break down the Altars of Baal.

But this Subject is not particularly connected with the preſent Diſquiſition, in which nothing is claimed for the eſtabliſhed Church, but what is claimed for every other Church, —the rigid Right of explaining to its Miniſter what doctrines it holds, and of permitting none to miniſter in it who do not profeſs the ſame Belief with itſelf. There muſt be a coercive Power lodged ſomewhere; no one will affirm that a Congregation of Chriſ-

tians has not a Right of rejecting a Miniſter, who preaches to them Mahometaniſm or Paganiſm; and no reaſon can be given for the Excluſion of ſuch a Miniſter, which will not operate in ſome degree in every Inſtance of a Miniſter's preaching contrary to the Belief of his Church.

To what Extent, and in what Circumſtances, it may be conſiſtent with Chriſtian Charity to uſe the Right here contended for, is quite another Queſtion; into the diſcuſſion of which I will not at preſent enter:—Things may be lawful for us, which may not be expedient.

THE END.